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For a couple of generations now, the dominant model of political theory – at 
least in the English-speaking world – has been to formulate ideal principles 
and concepts, and to assume that these must be expressed in political action. 
Since this model presupposes “the priority of the moral over the political” 
(Williams, 2005, p.2), it can be labelled “political moralism”. Since its prac-
titioners (Rawls, Dworkin, Raz, Habermas, to name a few) are preoccupied 
with characteristic liberal themes, such as justice, individual autonomy, human 
rights, and democratic deliberation, it is sometimes referred to as “liberal 
moralism”. In all its forms, it assumes, in the Kantian tradition, that reason 
can give us access to a fixed and stable moral order.
A striking feature of this type of theorising is its anti-political bias. As 
Glen Newey points out, the implementation of rational patterns of life, whate-
ver their content, “would herald the end of politics” (2001, p.7), if by that term 
we mean the clash of interests and opinions. One is reminded of Marx’s view 
of communism, “the riddle of history solved”, a society of perfect transparency 
and solidarity, where politics in the familiar sense of the word “withers away”. 
Marx realised that the supersession of politics spells the supersession of poli-
tical philosophy. Normative political philosophers of the present day resemble 
Marx in their search for a “final solution” to problems of political and social 
organisation, one that would render further speculation otiose. Even Habermas, 
who apparently wants to subject us to incessant political deliberation, assumes 
that universal dialogic procedures or discursive principles, which themselves 
embody absolute moral commitments, will provide a means of rationally resol-
ving practical discord. The purpose of public debate is merely to endorse deci-
sions generated by reason. The aim of political theory, for Habermas as for 
other political moralists, is to arrive at a set of ideal prescriptions rather than 
to justify preferences in the context of existing values and political constraints.
Perhaps inevitably, this reduction of political theory to applied ethics has 
given rise to a counter-movement of philosophers or theorists who find it insuf-
ficiently realistic and insufferably arrogant. The first rumblings of discontent 
were audible in the late 1980s, when Judith Shklar (1989) urged us to subs-
titute a “liberalism of fear” for the more fashionable liberalism of hopes and 
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dreams. But the reaction against political moralism has gathered pace during 
the past decade or so, with an increasing number of theorists challenging 
the idealistic identification of politics with mankind’s most noble aspirations 
(e.g. Newey, 2001; Williams, 2005; Mills, 2005; Farrelly, 2007; Miller, 2008, and 
Geuss, 2008). Now of course, Pareto scholars will know that he too was a critic 
of normative political theory, and that he worked in the tradition of political 
realism founded by Machiavelli (see Femia, 2006, chs. 4,6). Like the Florentine, 
Pareto conceived “the political” as a product of the appetitive nature of human 
beings, and ridiculed theorists who, positing a cosmic purpose or order, dreamt 
up imaginary republics of ideal virtue, without even the slightest genuflection to 
things as they are (Pareto, 1935 [1916], §277, §300). In the modern era, Pareto 
can be seen as the standard-bearer of political realism, which he opposed to 
the Enlightenment moralising that dominated the political discourse of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Yet the “new realists” do not seem to be 
aware of his existence. Some of them barely even mention Machiavelli. While 
they attack liberal moralism for its lack of historicity, their own awareness of 
the past hardly inspires confidence. But, needless to say, the fact that they are 
essentially “reinventing the wheel” does not negate the validity of their argu-
ments. In what follows, I want to examine the main criticisms of political or 
liberal moralism, and to argue that consideration of the attempts by Machiavelli 
and Pareto to establish political realism can shed light on the strengths and 
weaknesses of that approach.
1. THE CRITIQUE
Realist objections to normative political theory can be divided into four 
categories. First of all, it is deemed to be descriptively inadequate, insisting on 
the idealisation of reality “to the exclusion or at least marginalisation of the 
actual”(Mills, 2005, p.167). That is to say, it ignores the realities of power 
and recalcitrant political institutions; it pretends that traditions or economic 
constraints do not exist, and turns a blind eye to the plurality of values and 
interests in modern society. Assuming, as did Kant, that politics is the applica-
tion of a priori principles, discoverable by the exercise of pure reason, it seems 
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to be addressed to benign dictators in the Platonic mould who are empowered 
to enact morally perfect schemes – though no such audience exists in contem-
porary society. Such criticisms echo Pareto’s scorn for what he called “meta-
physical” thinking, which tried to demonstrate particular facts by means of 
general principles, instead of deriving the general principles from the facts. As 
he described his own theoretical project: “We have no knowledge whatever 
of what [...] ought to be. We are looking strictly for what is.” (1935 [1916], §28). 
Pareto was unremittingly hostile to the seductive idea that there is something 
perfect, a realm of Platonic Forms, which contrasts with the imperfect world 
of experience, and holds out the prospect of political and moral finality. In 
common with Machiavelli, who wanted to focus on – as he put it – “real truth” 
rather than “imaginary things” (1975 [1531], ch.XV, p.90-91), Pareto was deter-
mined to protect us from the tyranny of abstraction, and to take “experience 
and observation” as his guide (1935 [1916], §6). 
G.A. Cohen (2003, p.243-245) has responded to this strand of criticism by 
arguing that ideals such as justice are completely independent of facts about 
human social existence. Principles of justice tell us what we should think, not 
what we should do. Factual constraints are relevant to the application of such prin-
ciples, but the principles themselves must remain pure, cleansed of all empirical 
considerations. However, you do not have to be a Machiavellian realist to wonder 
whether the validation of moral principles can be independent of all facts. Take 
the concept of justice. A moment’s reflection will tell you that it becomes an 
issue only in what David Hume called the “circumstances of justice” – scarcity 
and limited altruism. If both material resources and human compassion were 
infinite, there would be no need for rules governing the distribution of benefits 
and burdens. To assume, as does Cohen, that a concept which owes its very exis-
tence to factual limitations could be “fact-insensitive” is conceptually incoherent 
(Farrelly, 2007, p.844-845). Consider another example. Could the moral objec-
tion to torture survive if mankind had a much reduced susceptibility to pain?
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This reference to human nature, to the natural human condition, brings 
us neatly to the second type of criticism levelled at the political moralists: that 
their theories violate the “ought implies can” proviso and are therefore prac-
tically unrealisable. The “motivations that are morally required of us”, asserts 
Thomas Nagel, “must be practically and psychologically possible, otherwise our 
political theory will be utopian in the bad sense” (1987, p.218). Normative poli-
tical thinkers tend to ignore this advice. They assume idealised human capaci-
ties and pay little or no heed to the limitations of human nature. Cosmopolitan 
theories of global justice, for example, rely on the prevalence (eventually, if not 
now) of an almost boundless altruism. Listen to Thomas Pogge, who seems 
to believe that strangers in distant lands are no less entitled to our beneficent 
concern than are our closest relatives: “[...] individual human beings are what 
ultimately matter; they matter equally, and nobody is exempted by distance or 
lack of shared community from political demands arising out of the counting 
of everybody equally” (1994, p.86). Similarly, the Habermasian ideal of endless 
democratic discourse presupposes the availability of almost unlimited time – or 
at least unlimited willingness to engage in public debate. Both Machiavelli and 
Pareto, by way of contrast, saw selfishness or egotism as a natural property of 
the human species. Indeed, the supposed constancy of human nature was what 
allowed them to discover repeated patterns in history. They poured scorn on 
all attempts to imagine man as an ideal moral being, and – like the present-day 
realists – saw no point in judging the real against a vision of perfection.
But here the moralists can enter a plausible objection. Surely moral prin-
ciples should allow us to criticise agents and practices that fail to conform to 
them. If we make no demands on the human capacity to make sacrifices for 
others, or for the common good, if we always assume the worst about human 
nature, how can we ever discover its limits? However, it is one thing to expect 
morality to challenge existing thought patterns; it is quite another to make 
demands that are alien to our deep-seated emotional needs and responses, such 
as our instinctive valuation of associative duties over those to remote strangers. 
As David Miller (2005, 2008) has argued, the universalism of normative poli-
tical theory requires too much of people – to act purely with regard to rational 
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considerations, to abstract oneself from all social particularity and become a 
citizen of nowhere, an impartial actor. There is the danger of slipping into a 
kind of absolutism, where – in the words of C.A.J. Coady – the “morally advisable 
becomes the morally obligatory, or the somewhat morally preferable becomes a 
stern duty” (2008, p.17). The purveyors of such absolutism, it could be argued, 
condemn themselves to moral irrelevance. A deontological ethic (I have Cohen in 
mind) in which the definition of what is right is not derived from a calculation of 
what is possible would oblige us to hold (oddly) that certain actions are morally 
obligatory even though no one, or hardly anyone, can be expected to perform 
them. Of course, this argument could be pushed too far. By definition the ideal 
stands in opposition to the real, and not even Machiavelli and Pareto wanted to 
deny that we could aspire to something better than the status quo. Moreover, 
the present unrealisability of an ideal does not show that it is unrealisable tout court. 
Slavery was once seen to be an entrenched part of the natural order, and those 
who opposed it were dismissed as idealistic visionaries. While there is no dispu-
ting such considerations, it is generally understood that moral thinking must pay 
attention to possibility and feasibility if it is to avoid destructive outcomes.
This brings us to the third type of criticism levelled at political moralism: 
that attempts to implement ideals, however admirable these ideals might seem, 
can lead to unintended and unwelcome consequences. The main problem here 
is the alleged mismatch between natural human behaviour and the require-
ments of the ideal. Machiavelli expressed this point with brutal clarity in chap-
ter 15 of The Prince, where he issued a warning to all “well-meaning” statesmen: 
“[...] the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide 
that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns 
the way to self-destruction rather than self-preservation.” (1975 [1531], p.91). 
Pareto, defending Machiavelli against the charge of immorality, points out how 
hard it is to get people to face inconvenient political facts: “Anyone viewing the 
facts objectively, anyone not minded deliberately to shut his eyes to the light, is 
forced willy-nilly to recognize that it is not by being moralists that rulers make 
their countries prosperous.” If anyone is to blame for this unpleasant truth, it 
is not the rulers but “‘corrupt’ humanity” (Pareto, 1935 [1916], §1975, §2410).
Revue européenne des sciences sociales 139
But those who are enamoured of normative ideals are not only accused of 
harbouring illusions about the powers and capacities of ordinary people and 
ordinary politicians; they are also berated for ignoring empirical constraints 
and competing ideals. In Machiavellian fashion, the critics draw attention to the 
paradox that virtues can become vices in a political context. It is not sufficient, 
they say, for philosophers to evaluate an ideal itself, in all its pristine purity; 
we must also assess the likely or necessary moral costs of the changeover to 
the supposedly ideal system. In Pareto’s words, we should “consider both the 
intended and the incidental effects” (ibid., §1864). Certain ideals should be rejec-
ted, not only if it is literally impossible to implement them, but also if in practice 
it would be too costly in terms of values we hold dear. According to J. Raikka:
Kant and his followers are wrong in claiming that only social arrangements 
that are impossible to carry out are infeasible. When evaluating the feasibi-
lity of a social institution, it is not enough to consider the strong constraints. 
Indeed, a political theorist should consider some of the weak constraints too, 
namely those that entail moral costs if the suggested institutional arrange-
ments are implemented (Raikka, 1998, p.37).
On this argument, even when a morally desirable ideal is infeasible only in 
the weaker sense, the morally correct approach would be to counsel compro-
mise. Ignoring Voltaire’s famous aphorism that “the best is the enemy of the 
good” could produce an outcome that makes the status quo seem attractive.
This argument is open to challenge, however, since it assumes that poli-
tical philosophers can accurately predict the costs of changing social arran-
gements, and in all circumstances. Political scientists, let alone political philo-
sophers, find it difficult to make such predictions; and in any case – say the 
defenders of normative theory – the evaluation of social ideals should be distin-
guished from the evaluation of policies designed to implement those ideals 
(O’Neill, 1988). This is true to a degree, but our accumulated human expe-
rience does provide solid evidence of the unwanted consequences that can be 
generated by pursuing certain ideals. The complexity of social causation need 
not reduce us to cognitive helplessness. While the twentieth century experi-
ment in communism is an obvious example, there are other, less dramatic 
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ones. We now know, for instance, that our high-minded efforts to aid poor 
individuals and countries can result in debilitating cycles of dependency. For 
a political philosopher simply to ignore such considerations when devising an 
ideal scenario would seem to be remiss, given that they appear to be grounded 
in unavoidable economic and administrative imperatives, and in permanent 
patterns of human motivation. An “ideal” theory is hardly ideal if its imple-
mentation will almost certainly entail significant moral costs.
It could be argued, however, that this “realist” argument is based on a narrow 
understanding of the functions served by universal ideals. Furnishing a blueprint 
for radical change is only one such function. As John Rawls (1999, p.216) has 
argued, an ideal conception gives us a standard by which to measure reality. How 
could we ever use the term “unjust” unless we had an ideal standard of justice 
to guide our judgement? This is an unconvincing argument. In order to identify 
individual cases of injustice, we need possess only a loose principle of fairness, 
which need not aspire to universality or timelessness. It may simply be inherent 
in the habitual practices of our society. How many people feel the necessity to 
consult an ideal political philosopher before making such judgements?
We therefore come to the fourth and final criticism of political moralism: 
that it lacks an historical perspective and shows no understanding that moral 
vocabularies will necessarily vary over time and space (e.g. Williams, 2005, p.13). 
When it comes to morality, realists are cognitive pessimists, who doubt that 
such a thing as “truth” exists or is usefully accessible to human intelligence. 
Political concepts, they tend to believe, are subject to competing interpretations 
and historical changes of meaning. It follows that the quest for an Archimedean 
point, removed from any context, is futile. In its Marxist, or postmarxist, form, 
this perspective goes so far as to accuse the liberal moralists of being bourgeois 
ideologists, reflecting in their ideas and values the interests and experiences 
of their own class. To Mills, their social ontology “will typically assume the 
abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism”. 
This ontology is oblivious to the “relations of structural domination” that 
profoundly shape the thought and behaviour of all social agents. The hypos-
tatised individual that dominates the discourse of liberal political philosophy, 
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that “natural” possessor of rights and freedoms, that exemplar of rationality, is 
nothing but a false universal, a mental construct, detached from the hegemo-
nic ideologies and group-specific experiences that distort our perceptions of 
the social order (Mills, 2005, p.168-172).
But one can reject the “spurious universalism” (ibid., p.173) of normative 
theory without endorsing class analysis and all its attendant intellectual baggage. 
Pareto, for his part, insisted on the inevitability of historical and cultural variation 
in the normative content of political concepts. Like Machiavelli and other realists, 
he was hostile to “essentialism” and to the assumption that “logic” and “reason” 
could or should dictate human behaviour (Pareto, 1935 [1916], §69, §300, §471). 
For him, ethical standards were not universal and rational truths but histori-
cally conditioned products of changing circumstances and shifting passions. The 
idea that such standards had a purely “logical” foundation was antithetical to 
his account of human psychology, which assumed that “sentiments”, or – in his 
distinctive jargon – “residues”, determined our behaviour, and that what we call 
rational judgement was merely an exercise in ex post facto justification for instinc-
tive preferences (ibid., §359). For example, when a person says “That thing is 
unjust” what he really means, according to Pareto, is “that the thing is offen-
sive to his sentiments” (ibid., §1210). These psychic states (sentiments/residues) 
were, in Pareto’s opinion, more or less universal responses, but their theoretical 
expression – belief systems or “derivations” – varied  according to context. From a 
Paretian perspective, then, the contractarian theory of Rawls would be dismissed 
as “essentialist” or “metaphysical” in its assumption of an objective idea of 
justice, floating above all historical and cultural particularities. Pareto was a critic 
of contract theory, seeing it as a bogus and futile attempt to escape temporal 
criteria of judgement (ibid., §.1146, §1504-1507). For him, political categories such 
as “justice” are functional rather than objective – serving both psychic and social 
needs. They can never achieve closure since their content – unlike their under-
lying motivation – is culturally determined (ibid., §1893). Pareto’s argument finds 
an echo in those critics of Rawls – often cultural relativists - who maintain that 
his theory of justice is nothing more than a liberal theory of justice, reflecting the 
outlook of comfortable American professors.
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Rawls and other normative theorists might object that such criticisms confuse 
questions of origin with questions of validation. The existence of historical and 
cultural diversity does not rule out the possibility that one single idea or ideal is 
indeed the true one, with the rest being impostors. Well, perhaps – but the libe-
ral idealists scrupulously avoid any reference to God or Revelation. In the absence 
of divine intervention, what mysterious factor or attribute has allowed them to 
overcome the cultural limitations that have afflicted all previous thinkers, and 
to arrive at the one true concept of humanity? Pareto was contemptuous of such 
pretentions. In his view, even if abstract moral absolutes did exist, we could 
never discover what they are, as they correspond to “nothing real”, nothing 
tangible (ibid., §1551). Except in the realms of logic and mathematics, we cannot 
demonstrate the truth or existence of what we cannot observe, or reduce to a 
set of identifiable empirical operations, performances, or capacities. For Pareto, 
as we have seen, abstract concepts such as “justice” are used to designate speci-
fic situations that agreeably stimulate our sentiments (ibid., §1210, §1609). Yet 
normative philosophers persist in their tortuous efforts to “prove” that the term 
refers to some objective reality that is not immediately evident to the senses. 
Pareto offers a psychological explanation for this otherwise puzzling “delusion”:
A person living in a civilised society becomes familiar with certain moral or juri-
dical relationships that are continually shaping his life, with which his mind is 
gradually saturated, and which end by becoming part and parcel of his intellectual 
personality. Eventually, through group-persistences, through his inclination to 
take what is relative as absolute, he carries them beyond the limits within which 
they may have been valid. They were adapted to certain circumstances, certain 
cases, merely; he makes them serve all cases, all circumstances. So concepts of an 
absolute morality and an absolute law come into being (ibid., §1501).
Pareto believes that the “residue” of “sociality” plays an important role here 
(ibid., §1429). If a person reading a poem exclaims, “It is beautiful”, he really 
means that it seems beautiful to him. Given our social/imitative nature, howe-
ver, anyone hearing the exclamation will feel that the poem ought to make a 
similar impression of beauty upon him. And so on and so forth. What was origi-
nally a subjective preference is transmuted into an “objective” fact. The percep-
tion grows that the poem is beautiful, no matter what people may think of it.
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2. TOWARDS A REALIST ALTERNATIVE
Even if we accept, as I do, that the realist criticisms of political or libe-
ral moralism are convincing, this does not necessarily mean that realism 
constitutes a viable alternative. Is it really possible, as Machiavelli and Pareto 
apparently claimed, to have a purely empirical political theory, one that only 
explores (as the Florentine put it) “what is actually done”, not “what should be 
done” (1975, ch.XV, p.91)? Are normative preferences not built into our descrip-
tive language? Do our factual claims not often have an evaluative element? 
When we describe the glass of water as either half empty or half full, are we 
not making a kind of value-judgement? Of course, we could simply say that a 
realist theory of politics should be primarily descriptive, even if it cannot avoid 
normative content altogether. When Pareto (1935 [1916], §365) writes that it is 
“not the function of theory to create beliefs”, he means that theorists should 
not presume to develop visions of the good society. It is not a logical corollary 
that they should eschew any hint of evaluation in their theoretical analyses. But 
there is a further question. Assuming it is possible, is it actually desirable to avoid 
direct consideration of “what ought to be”? Are we really willing to renounce 
the idea of a political “good” that transcends the actual, and to define politics 
as nothing more than the struggle for power and advantage? As Rawls has 
pointed out, “the limits of the possible are not given by the actual” (1999, p.12). 
Not without reason, the realist outlook is routinely lambasted for reifying the 
present by identifying existing arrangements with abstract necessity.
Despite their frequent professions of perfect scientific impartiality, neither 
Machiavelli nor Pareto rejected all normative claims. Although they offered no 
explicit conception of “the good”, nor any notion of the ideal arrangement of 
society, they both expressed clear political preferences. The former thinker 
defended the virtues of republican governance and called for the expulsion of 
foreign forces from the Italian peninsula; the latter was a champion of free 
market principles. Rather like Marx, however, they saw these preferences as 
emerging, almost naturally, from their empirical observations. When discussing 
Machiavelli, Antonio Gramsci –
 
Marx’s most eminent Italian disciple – reminded 
us that hostility to abstract universals does not necessarily exclude normative 
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aspirations, as long as these originate in real, observable social trends, and not 
in “idle fancy, yearning, daydream”. Far from being a Kantian moral imperative, 
the “ought-to-be” is, properly conceived, a projection of forms and principles 
inherent in existing reality (1971 [1929-1935], p.130, p.172). Gramsci is not saying 
that values can be logically deduced from facts about the world; he is simply saying 
that political values and goals should have a factual, as opposed to speculative, 
basis. It seems to me that the normative preferences expressed by Machiavelli 
and Pareto satisfy this criterion. In their writings, we can find the outline of a 
“realistic” political theory that can nevertheless transcend the present and fulfil 
the natural human desire for improvement. The theorist, on this conception, 
immerses himself in “what exists” in order to change society. But why does the 
realist thinker want to change society? After all, he disparages the doctrinal libe-
ral for seeking to eradicate the mysteries of the human world by substituting for 
them the certainty of applied reason. The answer perhaps lies in what is, for poli-
tical realism, the primary political objective: namely, the establishment of order 
and the conditions for cooperation. To most realists, the requirements of good 
order will not remain static. Because of the appetitive and competitive nature 
of human beings, order is precarious and susceptible to being undermined by 
any of the infinite variety of life’s contingencies. Given this existential instability, 
given this assumption that transience is part of the human condition, the main-
tenance of a balance of mutual advantage will often entail the need for innova-
tion. Ought propositions, in other words, would be fundamentally determined 
by the struggle for power, and not by a desire to impose timeless moral truths.
In defence of this position, Gramsci refused to accept a dichotomy between 
realism and idealism (ibid., p.172): “The opposition between Savonarola and 
Machiavelli is not an opposition between what is and what ought to be [...], 
but one between two concepts of what ought to be: the abstract and phan-
tasmagorical concept of Savonarola, and the realistic concept of Machiavelli”. 
Machiavelli was keen to mobilise the Italian people for progressive ends – ulti-
mately, the creation of a unified national state. But, to him, these ends were 
not imaginative constructs or logical deductions from first principles. To the 
contrary, they were practical aspirations, grounded in objective historical 
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forces. Gramsci, in his attempt to explain the nature of Machiavelli’s project, 
distinguished between two types of realism: one wishes only to “manage” the 
status quo, to preserve the existing configuration of power; the other is willing 
to pursue a radical agenda, since it views empirical reality not as “something 
static and immobile”, but as “a relation of forces in continuous motion” (ibid.). 
Gramsci saw his own thought (and Marxism in general) as exemplifying this 
“transformative” type of realism, whose origin he attributed to Machiavelli.
Pareto, too, maintained that the social system is “constantly changing in 
form” (1935 [1916], §2067). It is “never at perfect rest”, he informs us; “it is in 
a perpetual state of becoming” (1966 [1921], p.299). While he focuses on social 
equilibrium, it is a dynamic equilibrium, analogous to that of a living organism, 
not one defined by coexisting properties in a static system (1935 [1916], §2072). 
It was mentioned earlier that realists could advocate change as a way of preser-
ving social order in the face of instability. The richness of Pareto’s analysis 
allows us to explore this idea in greater depth. By way of preliminaries, let 
us bear in mind that realism, in the Machiavellian sense, is not just about 
practicality; it also involves the uncovering of hidden truths (motives, power 
relations, perverse consequences) lurking beneath the veneer of pieties and 
platitudes that sustains the status quo. The realist typically wants to lift the 
veils of euphemism and portray social and political life as it really is, without 
embellishment. In this sense, the realist, even if he veers to the right, is never 
conventionally conservative; he is alive to the contingencies and dysfunctions 
of society, and – at least in the cases of Machiavelli and Pareto – takes pleasure 
in pointing them out. Even if we remove Marxist “realists” from the equation, 
the realist mind-set is potentially, if not actually, subversive; its attachment to 
“what is” smacks of conditionality. The underlying structural reality of society 
may point in a different direction from its professed values and objectives. In 
Pareto’s equilibrium theory, the fundamental reason for such a discrepancy 
might lie in economic development, which often requires a corresponding 
change in the collective psychology or thought-processes of society in order 
to restore stability (ibid., §2340). As a realist, Pareto was hostile to change that 
originated in abstract theoretical schemes or in what he dismissed as “sermo-
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nizing”  (ibid.,  §2016). Such change he described as “artificial” rather than 
“normal” (ibid., §2067-2068), for it is disconnected from observable social 
trends. His equilibrium model is broadly “functionalist” in the sense that 
actions, whether individual or collective, are “selected” by their functional 
consequences. In his phrasing: “It is a matter of selection, the choice being 
dictated by the nature of the system” (ibid., §2268). What is functional at one 
time may not be functional at other times. Changing circumstances (not just 
economic change, but also events such as defeats in war or political upheavals) 
may cause a “normal” disturbance to the social balance. Existing modes of 
belief and political behaviour may appear “at odds with reality” and therefore 
unsustainable in present form. A “society which is not eager to decline or 
perish must necessarily reject them” (ibid., §2340).
Those who approach society from a broadly functionalist and realist pers-
pective will not always converge on the identification of dysfunctions or on 
their solution. A Marxist like Gramsci will stress the supposed contradictions 
of capitalism, along with their resolution in a form of radical socialism. Pareto, 
a staunch defender of capitalism, would hardly agree. It should be clear by 
now that a realist analysis cannot entirely detach itself from value preferences. 
As Gramsci recognised, however, there is no contradiction here. Such prefe-
rences are compatible with realism provided that they are embedded in society 
and do not express mere “yearning” or “daydream”. Of course, patterns of 
thought and behaviour in any modern society are complex and variable. 
Deciding which potential changes are “intrinsic” and which are – in Pareto’s 
parlance – “artificial” will inevitably involve a large degree of subjectivity – and 
this indeterminacy could be seen as a weakness. But what I think I have shown 
is that political moralism, with its exclusively normative concerns, does not 
enjoy a monopoly of political morality. Those who reject the abstract idealism 
of Anglo-American political philosophy are not thereby condemned to act as 
apologists for the status quo. And in their search for guidance in these matters, 
they would do well to consult the teachings of Machiavelli and Pareto.
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